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25/1/2003 11:32:11
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Subject: 2nd OAS Report (Nov 4,2002-Jan 4,2003) IP: Logged
Message: SECOND REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO THE PERMANENT COUNCIL ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CP/RES. 822, “SUPPORT FOR THE STRENGTHENING OF DEMOCRACY IN HAITI”
November 4, 2002—January 4, 2003
TRANSMITTAL LETTER
http://scm.oas.org/pdfs/2003/transmittalletter.pdf
Transmittal Letter iii
Formation of the Provisional Electoral Council (Cep) 2
Political Developments 3
Climate of Security 5
Role of the Police 6
Disarmament 7
Reparations 7
Prosecutions in Relation to December 17 7
Politically Motivated Crimes 8
Human Rights Developments 8
The International Community 9
The Special Mission 9
Conclusion 10
Annexes 13
Annex I 15
Terms of Reference for Technical Assistance from the OAS Special Mission to the Government of Haiti, 15 November, 2002 15
Annex II 27
Declaration of President Jean Bertrand Aristide Regarding Disarmament, Impunity, Gun Licences, Limit of Handguns for Parliamentarians and Local Officials and Limitations for Private Security Companies with Regard to Weapons, Uniforms, 14 November, 2002. 27
Annex III (A) 31
Declaration of Vertieres, 17 November, 2002. 31
Annex III (B) 33
Declaration of the Private Sector, “Non a L’intolerable, 23 November 2002. 33
Annex III (C) 37
Press Release of the Episcopal Conference, 29 Nobember, 2002. 37
Annex III (D) 41
Protestant Declaration, 29 November, 2002. 41
Annex III (E) 45
Resolution of the Summit of Opposition Political Forces, 15 December, 2002. 45
Annex III (F) 49
Joint Declaration of 184 Institutions, Associations and Organizations, 26 December, 2002. 49
Annex III (G) 57
Second Statement of the Summit of Opposition Political Forces, 1 January, 2003. 57
SECOND REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO THE PERMANENT COUNCIL ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CP/RES. 822, “SUPPORT FOR THE STRENGTHENING OF DEMOCRACY IN HAITI”
November 4, 2002—January 4, 2003
SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION
This Second Report of the Secretary General is presented to the Permanent Council pursuant to paragraph 14 of Resolution CP/822 of September 4, 2002, covering the period November 4, 2002 to January 4, 2003.
If the prospects for political and electoral progress in Haiti on September 4 were newly promising and on November 4, 2002 were still open, it must be said that on January 4, 2003 the situation has degenerated. Differences have grown, positions have hardened, polarization has sharpened and increased. Security and human rights concerns loom larger. Social tension has risen. The economic and financial picture is threatening, and the suffering of Haiti’s people has reached a clearly unacceptable level. The window for democratic elections in 2003, as provided for in Resolution 822, has narrowed drastically.
The hopes extant on November 4 that the short delay called for by civil society bodies would permit the parties to find a way to move ahead on formation of a Provisional Electoral Council, have not been realized. As the Assistant Secretary General told the Permanent council on December 9:
“Mr. Chairman, I regret greatly that it has to be said that since September 4 the Government of Haiti has not done enough to convince the entities concerned to name their representatives. Resolution 822 did not require that all obligations be completed by November. But meaningful progress was essential, not merely words.
… Meanwhile, some sectors have taken advantage of the inaction of the Government to change course from formation of the CEP as the first step towards elections to the mobilization of the population to bring down the Government…”
One month later, the Assistant Secretary General’s entire statement remains valid[1]/.
Failure to achieve a CEP on time has proven costly, as the focus on the CEP and preparation for elections in 2003 have during the reporting period been shunted aside by the rapid growth of political contestation, with vocal cries among opponents of the President for his departure answered by fervent expressions of support for a full presidential term (i.e. until February 2006) from Fanmi Lavalas adherents and “popular organizations”. This polarization has led to violence, and deaths. Voices of moderation in support of the democratic center on the basis of Resolution 822 have found it increasingly difficult to make themselves heard.
There is clearly and not surprisingly a rise in unhappiness and frustration among all sectors of the public, whether they support the Government, the Opposition, or are normally apolitical--given the protracted crisis affecting every part of life in Haiti. It must be hoped that it will remain possible to channel this energy in positive directions, in particular toward the holding of democratic elections that will pave the way for a resumption of political, economic and social development in the country.
While voicing moral support for the Special Mission, the international community, both member states and permanent observers of the OAS, have, since September 4, contributed some US$1,025,000 ($1million from the US Government, $20,000 from the Government of Brazil and $5,000 from the Holy See) to the greatly expanded work of the Mission[2]. However in the Secretary General’s formal request to member states and permanent observers in November 2002, which has since been circulated as CP/doc. 3680/02, it was indicated that the net initial requirements for the Special Mission are in the order of $12 million and that electoral and security requirements yet to be fully assessed would add significantly to this figure. Indeed, as of January 4, earlier amounts offered had not all arrived. At the same time, some have urged the Mission to be more active in providing early and substantial support for security and other activities in Haiti. It needs to be recognized that under the OAS financial system, no commitments, including contracts for personnel, can be made if the necessary funds have not been received in the OAS coffers.
Paragraph 11 of Resolution 822 gives the political green light to the international financial institutions to strengthen their work in Haiti, on the basis of their internal technical and financial provisions. These processes are under way and a number of visits and discussions have taken place, but during the reporting period nothing concrete had yet emerged for a variety of reasons both Haitian and international.
FORMATION OF THE PROVISIONAL ELECTORAL COUNCIL (CEP)
Formation of a CEP is crucial for the holding of elections in Haiti. Under the terms of Resolution 822, it was to be formed of nominees from nine entities agreed upon in the process of political negotiations prior to summer 2002. Previous developments were covered in the First Report.
At the end of October 2002, five of the entities (the Episcopal Conference of Haiti, the Protestant Federation of Haiti, the Episcopal Church of Haiti, the Commission of Justice and Peace and the Chamber of Industry and Commerce of Haiti) requested of the President that the government ask the OAS, through the Special Mission, for technical assistance to provide security for elections and implement measures of disarmament. By letter dated October 29 to the Head of the Special Mission, the Prime Minister solicited assistance of the OAS in the following areas: Professionalization of the Police, Justice, Human Rights, Good Governance, Elections (including Electoral Security) and Disarmament. The Head of the Special Mission agreed to provide technical assistance to Haiti in all these areas.
On November 4, the deadline set by Resolution 822 for the formation of the CEP, the five entities indicated in a letter to the President that they had selected their representatives and reaffirmed their commitment to the electoral process. Among the areas in which the Prime Minister requested assistance, the entities expressed particular interest in: professionalization of the police, electoral security and disarmament; they requested fifteen additional days (from November 4) for preparation of the terms of reference in those areas and for consultations on said matters with the political parties and civil society institutions.
On November 15, the terms of reference, prepared jointly by the Special Mission and the Government of Haiti in the areas of Elections, Election Security, Professionalization of the Police, Disarmament, were formally agreed upon between the Prime Minister and the Head of Mission. The documents were provided to the five entities and the political parties; and subsequently made public by the government. A copy is attached at Annex 1. At the same time, the President issued a Declaration (Annex 2) to remind all State institutions of their responsibilities in disarmament and the fight against impunity; and all citizens and security companies of laws and limitations pertaining to carrying weapons. Parliamentarians and locally elected officials were reminded that only handguns are permitted for their personal security.
Two days after the events of November 17 giving rise to the Declaration of Vertières (see below), the five entities wrote to the President of the Republic again on November 19, and advised him that on the basis of the President’s recent Declaration and the signature of the terms of reference by the Special Mission and the government, they had decided to submit the names of their representatives for the CEP. However, the entities conditioned swearing-in of their representatives on resolution of the issue of Reparations; and added a number of other elements where the degree of progress could affect their representatives’ continued participation in the CEP, including prosecution of persons implicated in the violent incidents of December 17, 2001 and implementation of the terms of reference (especially regarding security).
By letter dated December 6, the Prime Minister communicated to the Special Mission the names of the representatives of the government for the joint committees in the four areas cited above. However, by then, the issue of the formation of the CEP had been publicly sidelined by political action including street protests against the President; the five entities have made no further public move. It is accordingly convenient to turn to developments on the political front.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
In early November, an orchestrated campaign to oust the President commenced. On 17 November tens of thousands of people marched from Cap Haïtien (Haiti’s second largest city) to nearby Vertières (the site of the decisive 1803 battle in the Haitian war of independence). They issued the DÉCLARATION OF VERTIÈRES (Annex 3(a))[3], which appealed for the unity of all democratic sectors, postponement of the formation of the CEP and a general mobilization for the departure of President Jean Bertrand Aristide. The declaration, and the size of the turnout, animated the opposition forces that took to the streets in mass protests in different parts of the country over the following weeks.
On November 22, “popular organization” members supportive of the government virtually shut down Haiti’s capital, by strategically placing burning barricades throughout the city without intervention by the Police. These developments, and the shooting of students on November 20 (see section on climate of security below), provoked strong reactions from Haitian and international sources. The Special Mission issued a communiqué on November 25. The private sector reacted by issuing a strongly worded declaration on November 23, entitled “NON A L’INTOLÉRABLE”, deploring what it referred to as the intolerable and unacceptable “initiative to block the country and national life by institution of a climate of terror.” The document (Annex 3(b)) listed a number of grievances and called on the government to correct the situation.
Alarmed by the deterioration of the climate of security in the country, the Roman Catholic Church issued a “Communiqué of the Bishops of Haiti to the Haitian People and the International Community” on November 29 (Annex 3 (c)). The document criticized the use of violence, reprisals and mutual aggression as instruments of political discourse and appealed for dialogue and consultation to bridge differences. Significantly, the document included, as a matter for discussion, the duration of the presidential term. On the same date, the Protestant Federation also issued a statement deploring the turn of events and calling for reflection, compromise and cooperation. See Annex 3(d).
Demonstrations, both against and in favor of the government, continued in various parts of the country during the first week of December. Opposition groups called for a large-scale demonstration in Port-au-Prince on 3 December, the first anniversary of the killing of Petit Goâve journalist Brignol Lindor. Pro-Lavalas groups however prevented potential protestors from participation by attacking them upon arrival with whips, sticks and stones. Police presence was described as weak. Opposition spokespersons reported that some 52 people were injured; they called for a 24 hour strike, endorsed by the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Haiti, on 4 December. Although most big businesses closed, public transport, the informal sector and many schools remained open during the strike.
During the second week in December, demonstrations continued in many parts of the country. On December 15, an alliance of Convergence Démocratique, other political parties and a number of political personalities issued a Resolution under the title “SUMMIT OF POLITICAL FORCES OF THE OPPOSITION”. The document (Annex 3(e)) calls for the peaceful removal of the president from power and proposes a mechanism for the constitution of a Government of Transition with a four-point program “to assure political stability in Haiti and to guarantee the effective return to constitutional order.”
On December 17, the Convergence Démocratique marked the first anniversary of the events of December 17, 2001 with a mobilization at its headquarters in Port-au-Prince. A crowd estimated variously between 200 and 1,000 persons attended; the leadership denounced the government and reiterated its call for the departure of the president.
From December 21 to January 8 the Government decreed a truce in demonstrations over the holiday period. It is worth noting that a shortage of all kinds of fuel (triggered by dramatic reduction in traditional supplies from Venezuela) led to considerable inconvenience. The subsequent drastic increase in prices by the government once supplies, resume also stimulated unrest, which continued into January.
One hundred and eighty four institutions, associations and organizations of civil society, issued a joint declaration on December 26, 2002 (Annex 3(f)). They called for discussion of a social contract; and set seven conditions for engagement in the electoral process; (a) freedom of association, assembly and expression; (b) disarmament and dismantling of armed gangs; (c) prosecution of the assassins of Jean Dominique and Brignol Lindor; (d) release of political prisoners and all those who have had a court ruling in their favour; (e) cessation of heinous and violent public declarations; (f) security for journalists and other citizens under threat of violence; and (g) implementation of the terms of reference drawn up by the OAS Special Mission and the Government. The institutions gave the Government until January 15 to carry out or begin to satisfy their demands.
On January 1, the “SUMMIT OF POLITICAL FORCES OF THE OPPOSITION” issued a second statement (Annex 3(g), affirming that President Aristide was the principal obstacle to creation of a democratic republic in Haiti, and stating that they would not recognize any act or undertaking by the government of President Aristide which they felt violated the Constitution or laws of Haiti, damaged the higher interests of the people or nation of Haiti and created obligations for Haiti on the international scene or for the Haitian people.
CLIMATE OF SECURITY
The climate of security has declined during the reporting period, stimulated by the anti-government actions and the reactions of pro-government groups. The Prime Minister responded to the increasing violence with a warning to the population against provocation which could lead to civil war. Both the President and the OAS called for calm during the last week of November, as did the Roman Catholic Church and the Protestant Federation.
On 20 November, police opened fire on and injured some 9 high school students in Petit-Goâve. The above-mentioned 22 November shut-down of Port au Prince and violence against the Opposition demonstration of December 3 contributed to growing concern that freedom of movement and of expression were at risk.
During a day of protests and counter-protests on 28 November, but in as yet unclear circumstances, a Belladère-based, Fanmi Lavalas justice of the peace, Christophe Lozama, was shot dead in Lascahobas. Fanmi Lavalas accused opposition supporters in the killing of Lozama, and the international community of not paying it adequate attention. On 10 December a dozen heavily armed masked men invaded the Lascahobas police station, seized police weapons and liberated the four detainees, two of whom were reportedly implicated in the 28 November killing of the justice of the peace. The assailants also killed four individuals, two of whom were known supporters of Fanmi Lavalas, and burned a police car before they escaped to the Dominican Republic. An initial report released by a human rights organization stated there were no police officers at the station at the time of the attack.
The Movement for National Development (MDN) Party headquarters and adjoining depots were burned in what police confirm was an act of arson on 7 December. Party leader Hubert De Ronceray blamed Fanmi Lavalas supporters, who he said had previously threatened to burn them down. In contrast, initial police reports suggested that MDN members were themselves suspected as authors of the crime. Senator Dany Toussaint reported that an attempt was made on his life in Pétionville on that same night. He blamed at the Secretary of State for Public Security and police, stating that his police bodyguards had been transferred the day of the attack.
On 20 December the Communication Minister issued a public statement that fifty heavily armed former military men had raised the Duvalierist flag and were terrorizing the population in Pernale, Central Plateau. The men were accused of perpetrating the 10 December Lascahobas attack. Although opposition leaders expressed skepticism about the group’s existence, Radio Metropole interviewed alleged members who claimed that their goal was to oust President Aristide and reinstate the army. On 21 December a special police unit raided the village using grenades. Four men were arrested and ten homes were somehow burned.
A special word needs to be said about developments in Gonaives. It will be recalled that Gonaives was the site of a mass prison break on August 2, when supporters of Amiot Métayer (implicated by the OAS Commission of Enquiry in the events of December 17,
2001) stormed the prison and released him and 158 other detainees including Jean Tatoune, another local leader of a muscular “popular organization”. Since his release, Métayer has apparently moved around Gonaives quite openly. He and his supporters (the so-called “Cannibal Army”) have exercised de facto control of much of the city, including harassment of the Police, prevention of marches by civil society groups and intimidation of the press. Indeed, on his insistence, the Government Delegate resigned her office and the President quickly named another person in her stead. On 26 November, clashes which took place between pro and anti government camps in Gonaïves left several injured with gunshot wounds. On the same day, OAS Mission members were shot at in an unmarked vehicle by unidentified individuals conducting weapons searches in an area largely controlled by groups opposed to the government. No one was hurt. The Mission statement on the incident can be found on the OAS web site. During the weekend of 29 November to 1 December local press reported that the killing of a “Cannibal Army” member in Gonaives, allegedly by a member of Jean Tatoune’s group currently supporting the opposition, sparked acts of revenge by the “Cannibal Army”, killing three and setting at least twenty houses on fire. Government spokesmen have made clear that they would not be sending in the Police to deal with the situation in Gonaives, adducing the strength of the heavily armed local organizations and the fear of a blood bath. Others have voiced scepticism about the government’s motives.
ROLE OF THE POLICE
The role of the Police has been mixed. On occasions such as the November 17 opposition demonstration in Cap Haitien, the Police were clearly given the proper orders and acted effectively and in exemplary fashion. Unfortunately, in other cases, such as Petit-Goâve on November 20 and Port-au-Prince on November 22 (above), their behaviour was either actively inappropriate or inexcusably passive. They have apparently had no orders to re-establish law and order in Gonaives, admittedly a complex situation, but nonetheless the “City of Independence,” (i.e. where the Independence of Haiti was declared) a port not far from the capital, where normal governance is simply not taking place. There is also a major problem in the Central Plateau and on the frontier with the Dominican Republic. It is alledged that there are drug implications in connection both with Lascahobas and Gonaives.
It is clear that the Police lack sufficient officers, though placing of the newly trained recruits of the 14th Promotion in the second quarter of 2003 will help. In this regard, retraining and skills upgrading of management levels is an urgent requirement, one with which the Mission is prepared to assist, resources permitting. The Police should be given clear and transparent (i.e. published) standing orders for dealing with public order, including demonstrations and blockades.
DISARMAMENT
In its Report of November 4 on implementation of Resolution 822, the Government mentioned seizure of a number of arms. The Mission has proposed that these arms be verified by the Mission and destroyed or otherwise publicly disposed of, e.g. by formal transfer to the National Police. This matter remains under discussion.
The Report prepared by the Mission on the Disarmament Seminar held in the previous reporting period has been completed and is being printed for public distribution and use by the Government-Mission joint committee on disarmament.
REPARATIONS
Most regrettably, more than one year after these grave violations of human rights were committed, this matter has not yet been concluded. The Special Mission, and others, have repeatedly urged the Government to finalize all aspects, including for those victims not members of political parties many of whose claims have yet to be properly addressed. The Government, it is true, has recently been more active in negotiating with the political parties. However by the end of the reporting period an agreed conclusion had not come about with the OPL or with MOCHRENHA. The Government of Haiti should finalize immediately the cases relating to the political parties of the Convergence Démocratique, and devise swiftly a mechanism to settle the matter objectively for all other victims, individual or institutional.
PROSECUTIONS IN RELATION TO DECEMBER 17
Overall throughout the country, investigation of this issue has been flawed and plagued with serious gaps and delays. There have been no final indictments as yet. According to information available to the Special Mission, six persons have been arrested since the beginning of the judicial investigation, two of them since November 4--all in the jurisdiction of Port-au-Prince, including two Fanmi Lavalas municipal delegates prosecuted in regard to the criminal arson of political party ALAH’s office and the house of party leader Reynold Georges. In the Report of the Commission of Inquiry, more than twenty individuals were named by victims, witnesses and other sources in relation to the violence of December 17 throughout the country. Few have been interrogated by the different investigative judges around the country. Most are said to be either members of Fanmi Lavalas or are occupying government functions.
In addition, no judicial investigation has been conducted into the apparently passive role of the police force regarding the events of December 17, 2001, in contrast to its duty to “protect” the public security. No HNP officer has been prosecuted, indicted or dismissed from his post, though an important internal report has been prepared by the Inspector General. Nor has the public been told how the HNP was subsequently strengthened so as better to fulfill its mission.
POLITICALLY MOTIVATED CRIMES
The murder cases of Jean Dominique and Jean Claude Louissaint are stagnating, unresolved. Although investigative judge Bernard St-Vil planned to end his investigation of these cases by the end of 2002, according to the Government in its first report on the execution of Resolution 822, the Special Mission has been unable to certify that progress was made during the current period.
As stated in the First Report, Brignol Lindor’s representatives have lodged an appeal against the indictment report of the investigative judge. According to information made available to the Mission by Lindor’s lawyers, hearing of the appeal case is scheduled for January 16, 2003. This is a positive development, though the appeal could take some considerable time to be concluded. However, of ten persons against whom charges were laid, only two have been arrested to date. Moreover, on December 25, Michèle Montas, Director of Radio Haiti Inter and wife of slain journalist Jean Dominique, suffered an armed attack at her domicile by unidentified gunmen; she was unhurt but a bodyguard, Maxime Séide, was killed. The Special Mission met with her on December 26 and issued a communiqué the next day (see OAS web site).
Finally, the Special Mission has no concrete evidence of any action since the adoption of Resolution 822 on the past cases of grave violations of human rights that were part of a list forwarded to the Ministry of Justice on June 17, 2002.
HUMAN RIGHTS DEVELOPMENTS
As will be already clear, human rights conditions deteriorated in this period (see also section “Climate of Security”).
The summary execution of three young men from the same family on December 8 in the Carrefour area of the capital, apparently by local police for reasons related to a jealous quarrel, brought to light a radical breakdown of discipline and respect for rights in the police force. The murders of prominent businessman Gerard Kawholy December 6 and medical student Eric Pierre in early January provoked many questions.
In addition to the killing of the security guard of radio journalist Michèle Montas, referred to above, other attacks on the press included the November 17 arson by government supporters of Radio Etincelle in Gonaives and threats against seven Gonaives journalists, who have gone into hiding. Pro-government forces were also reportedly involved in threats and an attack on Radio Maxima in Cap Haitien. Meanwhile, reporters for pro-government Télévision National d’Haiti and Télé Timoun were roughed up by opposition demonstrators in December.
Meanwhile, lawyers for Rosemond Jean, leader of victims of the Cooperative crisis, were unable to gain a hearing on a petition of habeas corpus for their client and he remained in prison, as did former President, General Prosper Avril, despite an October 22 Court of Appeals order that he be freed. The issue of disappearances remained preoccupying.
The Inter American Commission on Human Rights has received several additional cases in which Haitians have requested precautionary measures under the inter-American human rights system. The cases were pending at the close of the reporting period.
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
Government voices have on several occasions accused the international community of maintaining “sanctions” against Haiti and of failing to deliver on its commitments to take concrete steps to normalize Haiti's relations with the donor community pursuant to OAS Resolutions. On December 9, 2003, the World Bank convened a meeting of the Haiti Contact Group, a gathering of donors with interests in Haiti, to discuss the political and economic situation in the country. They expressed their readiness to assist Haiti to resolve its difficulties, but concrete engagement also required key decisions by the Haitian side. Donors further agreed that the Organization of American States’ Resolution 822 passed in September 2002 should continue to be pursued vigorously to put Haiti on a path toward credible elections in 2003.
The international community has outlined more than once the type of concrete steps toward implementation of Resolutions 806 and 822, which along with settlement of Reparations, could facilitate a resolution of the crisis: (a) arrests of persons implicated in the violence of December 17, 2001; (b) disarmament measures, e.g. of the gangs; (c) implementation of the terms of reference drawn up between the OAS Mission and the government; and (d) pursuing the investigation into politically-motivated killings. Conclusion of an agreement with the international financial institutions would also inspire confidence in the administration, reduce the volatility in the economy and thus contribute to a resolution of the crisis.
The Group of Friends of the Secretary General on Haiti, particularly those in Port au Prince, continued to meet regularly in order to consult on developments and provide advice and assistance to the Special Mission.
THE SPECIAL MISSION
The Special Mission met on a number of occasions with President Aristide, Prime Minister Neptune, Foreign Minister Antonio, Justice Minister Delatour, Secretary of State Dubreuil and the Director of the National Police, among others, in order to discuss and encourage implementation of the Resolutions. After a lengthy meeting with the President on December 16 to discuss the urgent need for action on Government obligations under Resolution 822 in order to facilitate formation of the CEP, a small mixed committee was established to examine what needed to be done urgently and how to “dynamise” that work. The group met and discussed several times over the next week or two, but there were no concrete actions by the Government within the reporting period.
The Mission also continued to meet with entities intended to provide representatives for the CEP, with political parties, with the churches, and with civil society, in order to advance the process envisaged under Resolution 822, especially the holding of credible elections in 2003.
The Mission worked out in cooperation with the Government Terms of Reference on Elections, Election Security, Professionalization of the Police and Disarmament. Implementation has been slowed due to increasing focus by the Government and the Mission on other political and security issues during the reporting period; and the need of the Mission for additional resources. Good progress has been made on preparing terms of reference with the Government in the other areas of work of the Mission and it is anticipated that they will be completed early in 2003. It has been agreed that the primary focus should be on work related to elections and related matters, especially security.
The Mission signed agreements with the Minister of Justice in December relative to training of court clerks (greffiers) and magistrates to be carried out with the financial and technical assistance of the Government of France at the École de la Magistrature. The Mission intensified its involvement in training of the 14th Promotion of the National Police at the Police Academy, including on human rights; the class of nearly 850 will graduate in early spring and be available to strengthen the Police in various priority areas.
The Mission has continued its work in relation to the public, responding to many requests for information and assistance, including regarding human rights concerns. Visits have been paid to the North, including assisting with human rights seminars. The Head of Mission has also responded to the considerable interest from the press in the views of the OAS and the work of the Mission in Haiti
CONCLUSION
The people of Haiti need an opportunity to fulfill their aspirations in peace and safety. With a view to the maintenance of public order and also respect for the constitutional right to freedom of expression, it is in the interests of all sides to adhere to a few fundamental principles to avert further violence: (a) all demonstrations by supporters of the government or opponents of the government, including marches, should be peaceful and in accordance with the law; (b) there should be no reprisals, intimidation or acts of aggression or violence against citizens exercising their Constitutionally provided rights; (c) barricades or burning of tires should not be used to interfere with the normal lives of citizens; and (d) violence, irrespective of the source, should be consistently condemned in private and in public.
The situation in Haiti today, compared to that during the OAS-facilitated negotiations to resolve the crisis following the May 2000 elections, is more polarized and complex. Opposition to the Government is more broad-based, diverse and committed to a maximalist objective: the removal of the President from office. The demands are as diverse as the opposition and it is difficult to ascertain the level or extent of the support for or degree of commitment to the initiatives. The current political impasse has created such polarization that unless the moderate elements regain control of the process, there is a possibility of armed conflict.
The President is of the view that his opponents talk of democracy, but are not committed to its implications. He insists that he speaks for the majority of the people and that he enjoys their support. He dismisses his opponents as a minority of disparate elements that are attempting to achieve through negotiations and mass protests, what eluded them at the polls. He asserts that their concerns are either not genuine or the remedy sought is out of proportion to their alleged grievances: the real objective is to undermine his presidency. The difficulty is that the president's failure to deliver is being used as the basis for mobilizing against him or to abstain from the process.
For the opposition in its various forms, the President cannot be believed: he simply wants to proceed to elections without fully implementing Resolution 822, thus guaranteeing in their view the type of “victory” Fanmi Lavalas won in May 2000. Unlike last autumn, the opposition position is that, while they remain committed to elections along the lines provided for by Resolution 822, they are no longer prepared to go to elections under President Aristide. They argue that public support is swinging their way; and castigate the government and its supporters for using intimidation and worse to browbeat any independent voices. They plan to continue their mobilization in various forms; and would wish the international community to support the aims of their two communiqués, in particular the early resignation of President Aristide.
Civil society has become more active since the adoption of Resolution 822, and the voice they have under it in choosing representatives to the CEP. The five entities intended to propose nominees to the CEP forwarded a joint November 19 letter (see above, section on CEP) but have not pursued matters publicly since. However, as indicated, other parts of civil society, under the leadership of the Initiative of Civil Society (ISC), have held many meetings and issued the December 26 communiqué already mentioned, including its January 15 deadline for the government to act on their demands in order for them to decide on their course in relation to elections and other matters.
For its part, the international community must implement its agreed obligations to provide resources for carrying out the tasks of the Special Mission and for moving ahead with other provisions of Resolution 822.
ANNEXES
ANNEX I
TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FROM THE OAS PECIALMISSION TO THE GOVERNMENT OF HAITI, 15 NOVEMBER, 2002
TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR DISARMAMENT
1. Context and justification
Resolutions CP/RES. 806 (1303/02) and CP/RES. 822 (1331/02) of the Organization of American States, dated January 15 and September 4, 2002, respectively, entrust the OAS with supporting the Government of Haiti in its disarmament campaign.
In a letter dated October 29, 2002, Prime Minister Yvon Neptune officially requested technical assistance for the Government from the OAS Special Mission in Haiti in connection with “disarmament.”
2. Objective
To incorporate into a global framework of government measures the existing national disarmament plan and national disarmament program of the Haitian National Police (PNH) by strengthening them both in terms of their impact and their implementation.
3. Measures to be taken and support for the OAS Special Mission
A. Measures
§ Establishment and installation of a government mechanism, to be known as the National Disarmament Committee, to take charge of the disarmament process.
§ Establishment of an advisory board, consisting inter alia of representatives of the political parties, civil society, and churches to oversee the process and make any recommendations deemed appropriate;
§ Strengthening of the public awareness campaign in the media;
§ Organization of a national campaign to increase the population’s awareness of the topic of disarmament;
§ Recruitment of resource persons at the national and international levels;
§ Studies on successful experiences in other countries, such as El Salvador, Brazil, etc.;
§ A public ceremony to acknowledge the destruction of illegal weapons confiscated or seized by the police during police operations that were not required for legal proceedings;
§ Identification nationwide of persons possessing weapons and of weapons caches;
§ Searches and other operations to control and recover said weapons;
§ Collection of unauthorized weapons in the hands of elected officials (mayors, members of parliament) and high government officials, regularization of their weapons;
§ Strengthening of the capacity of the Haitian National Police to collect unauthorized weapons, keep them secure, and destroy them as applicable;
§ Adaptation, dissemination, and application of the legal framework for the acquisition and sale, possession, and bearing of arms in the country;
§ Establishment of a grace period for a specific time for anyone who voluntarily surrenders illegally held weapons;
§ Consideration of the mounting of a pilot project as an integral part of the national disarmament plan.
B. Support
The OAS Special Mission pledges to provide its assistance in pursuing the established objective.
4. Special Measures: Support for communities in reducing armed violence
Concrete, realistic measures are needed to provide the country’s disadvantaged communities with the means required to reduce the causes and effects of insecurity linked to violence and the absence of socioeconomic opportunities. These measures, which go hand in hand with the disarmament process, consist inter alia of:
a. Increasing the awareness of society and community groups and mobilizing them so as to heighten the understanding of the problem, identify needs, and develop a participatory, community strategy for intervention and prevention.
b. The launching of socioeconomic and development activities to provide positive alternatives to armed violence and increase the capacity to involve society’s marginalized groups.
c. The voluntary surrender of weapons by individuals and communities to strengthen ties between security and development and affirm the desire of these communities to ward off armed violence in Haiti.
5. Follow-up
a. A joint committee is established to oversee the implementation of these terms of reference. The Joint Committee may, if necessary, call upon other experts to assist it.
b. The Committee consists of representatives appointed respectively by the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, and the OAS Special Mission. If deemed necessary to support its work, it could set up a technical committee and establish subcommittees in the departments and communes.
TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR ELECTORAL SECURITY
1. Context and justification
Resolutions CP/RES. 806 (1303/02) and CP/RES. 822 (1331/02) of the Organization of American States, dated January 15 and September 4, 2002, respectively, established that the OAS Special Mission to Strengthen Democracy in Haiti was to provide assistance to the Government of the Republic of Haiti with regard to the establishment of mechanisms and procedures to guarantee the security of all political parties and their members and candidates, with a view to creating a climate conducive to the holding of future elections in the country. To that end, the OAS recommended that a security plan be drawn up and a climate of security established for the 2003 elections.
In a letter dated October 29, 2002, Prime Minister Yvon Neptune officially requested assistance for the Government from the OAS Special Mission in Haiti in connection with “the elections, including electoral security.”
2. Objectives
§ To help create a secure environment conducive to the smooth running of the electoral process;
§ To help prepare the National Electoral Security Plan;
§ To assist the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP), the PNH, and other Haitian authorities in establishing a national security plan;
3. Measures to be taken and support for the OAS Special Mission
A. MEASURES
§ Establishment by the PNH of a security mechanism for the protection of:
§ The agents, premises, and members of the CEP, as soon as it is set up;
§ The Electoral Guarantees Committee, once it is established;
§ All political parties, candidates, premises, residences, registration and polling stations, etc., once the electoral process has been set in motion;
§ Enhancement of the operational capacity of the PNH to ensure proper conditions for a secure electoral process (see the terms of reference for the professional development of the PNH);
§ PNH implementation of a staff training program in the protection of and respect for political parties and public and individual freedoms in the context of the electoral process;
§ Strengthening of the Office of the Secretary of State for Public Security in the context of more rigorous monitoring of security agencies;
§ Facilitation of the CEP role in monitoring PNH action regarding the electoral process;
§ Preparation of the National Electoral Security Plan.
B. OAS SUPPORT
In partnership with the Haitian counterpart, the Special Mission is in a position to provide assistance in the form of international support staff.
This staff will be entrusted with helping the CEP in its mission to ascertain that the PNH is performing its functions in an impartial, neutral, and equitable manner and also with giving the PNH support it its preparation of the National Electoral Security Plan.
As part of a smooth electoral process, the international staff appointed by the Special Mission will serve as technical advisers of their Haitian counterparts. They will provide their counterparts with specific advice and assistance in the field concerning the security of the electoral process. They should also help to supervise the effective implementation of the National Electoral Security Plan.
As security experts, they may work with the PNH in formulating the Training Program to be implemented once the electoral process has been set in motion for the police as a whole.
o A technical adviser will be assigned to the CEP and the Electoral Guarantees Committee;
o Two (2) will be assigned to the Central Office of the PNH Administrative Police, of which
· One (1) is responsible for assistance in drafting the National Electoral Security Plan and the establishment of the priority needs of the PNH;
· And the other is responsible for assistance in planning elections [cards, lists of registration and polling stations (BIV), polling stations (BV), political parties, candidates, various documents, etc.].
Plans exist for a unit of 100 police officers for the departmental offices and for assistance in drawing up the National Electoral Security Plan and supervising its application. These officers will be armed with handguns and will be in place for four months. They will have their own logistical support with road and air transportation, computers, office equipment, etc.
4. Follow-up
a. A joint committee is established to oversee the implementation of these terms of reference;
b. The Joint Committee consists of representatives appointed respectively by the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, and the OAS Special Mission.
TERMS OF REFERENCE
FOR THE PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT
OF THE HAITIAN NATIONAL POLICE
1. Context and justification
Resolutions CP/RES. 806 (1303/02) and CP/RES/ 822 (1331/02) of the Organization of American States, dated January 15 and September 4, 2002, respectively, stipulated that the OAS Special Mission to Strengthen Democracy in Haiti should provide the Government of the Republic of Haiti with technical and financial support for, inter alia, the “professional development” of the Haitian National Police (PNH) as an institution with enough personnel to meet the security needs of the country.
In a letter dated October 29, 2002, Prime Minister Yvon Neptune officially requested assistance for the Government from the OAS Special Mission for “the professional development of the Police.”
2. Objective
To strengthen the professional development and operating capacity of the PNH to enable it to respond effectively to the security needs of the country.
3. Measures to be taken and support for the OAS Special Mission
A. Measures
· Improvement of recruitment conditions;
· Training of a thousand police officers per year;
· Retraining of all senior officers and other PNH personnel;
· Development and introduction of a career plan for police officers and administrative staff;
· Strengthening of the PNH’s management and budgeting capabilities;
· Strengthening the Management of the School of Continuing Education (DEFP);
· Laying the foundations for the creation of the Police Academy;
· Quantitative and qualitative strengthening of the chain of command and raising the quality of the commanding officers;
· Establishment of the border police, along with strengthening of the cooperation between Haiti and the Dominican Republic;
· Creation of other important units and services required for the security and proper functioning of the police institution, especially insurance coverage, the beginnings of an airborne police unit, medical care and social services, etc…;
· Cooperation with CARICOM in regional efforts to combat drug trafficking and the circulation of illegal weapons;
· Strengthening of operational mechanisms designed to develop and consolidate a climate of security with a stronger police presence on the ground;
· Rapprochement between the police and the population, with community-oriented police activities; and
· Strengthening and decentralization of the Inspector General’s functions:
- Continuation of internal efforts to combat human rights violations by PNH personnel;
- Stricter observance of the code of professional ethics; and
- Efforts to combat corruption.
B. Support
In partnership with the Haitian counterpart, the Special Mission is in a position to provide assistance, where needed, in the form of international support staff.
These will be appropriately qualified technical advisors to train PNH commanders in the procedures required for the professional development of the institution.
Technical advisors may be deployed, as needed, at the following levels:
- Office of the Director General;
- Office of the Inspector General;
- Central Administrative and General Services Department (DCASG);
- Department of Human Resources;
- Department of Logistics;
- Police Academy; and
- Nine (9) Departmental Directorates
Other national resources will be tapped, as needed and subject to budgetary constraints.
4. Follow-up
a. Following adoption of these terms of reference, a Joint Committee is formed to oversee their implementation.
b. This Joint Committee is composed of representatives appointed, respectively, by the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, and the OAS Special Mission.
TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR ELECTIONS
1. Context and justification
Resolution CP/RES. 822 (1331/02) of September 4, 2002 reaffirms the importance of holding elections in 2003 on a date to be chosen by the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP). The resolution adds that the CEP is to establish an Electoral Guarantees Commission (CGE) and points to a number of steps to be taken to facilitate the holding of “free, fair, and technically feasible” elections.
In a letter dated October 29, 2002, Prime Minister Yvon Neptune officially requested assistance for the Government from the OAS Special Mission in Haiti in connection with “the elections…”
2. Objective
To facilitate the holding of free, fair, and technically feasible legislative and local elections–on a date in 2003 to be chosen by the Provisional Electoral Council–in which all political parties can participate freely and securely.
3. Measures to be taken and support for the OAS Special Mission
A. Measures
a. Conduct a swearing-in ceremony, as stipulated in the Constitution (in the presence of the President of the Republic). Upon taking the oath, the members of the CEP declare their readiness to cooperate in a collegial and professional manner, on the basis of the Haitian Constitution and resolution CP/RES. 822, with the technical and financial support of the Government of Haiti and of the international community;
b. With the technical and financial assistance of the international community, lend the CEP all the support it needs to be able to fulfill its mission effectively. (Appointment of sufficient, competent personnel, salaries, purchase of material, etc…);
c. Take specific steps, in cooperation with the Joint Committee on Electoral Security, to ensure the safety of the CEP, its advisors and personnel, and those of the Electoral Guarantees Committee throughout the country;
d. Facilitate the provision of technical and financial support by the international community, including visits by teams to help prepare the technical aspects of the elections;
e. Provide assistance and support to national and international observer missions as established in the corresponding agreement;
f. Guarantee, through appropriate measures throughout the country, protection of the rights of political parties, their members and staff, of the candidates, and of any citizen engaged in lawful political activities. This protection should also extend to freedom of speech and the right to hold political meetings and demonstrations in accordance with the law;
g. Take steps to safeguard the rights and freedoms of the press, as well as the impartiality of government media; and
h. Encourage dialogue between all players in the Haitian political arena, so as to promote national consensus and a favorable climate for satisfactory elections in 2003.
B. Support
In partnership with the Haitian Government and other stakeholders, the Special Mission is in a position to provide assistance in the form of international support staff.
Their responsibilities will include:
· Assisting the Government in the context of its support for the electoral process;
· Facilitating the work of the CEP in organizing legislative and local elections in Haiti in 2003 (while respecting the Council’s independence);
· Organizing a visit to Haiti by an international team for a period of approximately two weeks for talks about the electoral process with the Government and the CEP and in order to ascertain technical assistance, electoral observation, and security needs;
· Assisting the work of the CGE;
· Preparing for the arrival of a sufficiently large contingent of (approximately 200) international observers designed to boost voter confidence and establish the credibility of the electoral process;
· Preparing training sessions for Haitian and international observers on Haitian laws and electoral observation techniques, as well as on the need for objectivity and impartiality in electoral observation;
· Facilitating and supporting the work of the national and international observers;
· Supporting a civic education program about the elections; and
· Facilitating contributions by the international community.
4. Follow-up
a. A Joint Committee is formed to oversee implementation of the terms of reference.
b. This Joint Committee is composed of representatives appointed, respectively, by the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, and the OAS Special Mission.
ANNEX II
DECLARATION OF PRESIDENT JEAN BERTRAND ARISTIDE REGARDING DISARMAMENT, IMPUNITY, GUN LICENCES, LIMIT OF HANDGUNS FOR PARLIAMENTARIANS AND LOVCAL OFFICIALS AND LIMITAIONS FOR PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES WITH REGARD TO WEAPONS.UNIFORMS, 14 NOVEMBER, 2002
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
SM-600.02 Port-au-Prince, November 14, 2002
Messrs. Representatives
of the five signatory institutions
of the letter of November 4, 2002
Dear Sirs:
On behalf of the Head of State, His Excellency Jean-Bertrand Aristide, I have the honor of acknowledging receipt of your letter of November 4, 2002, to the Head of State, in which you inform him of the successful conclusion of your efforts to appoint your representatives to the Provisional Electoral Council (C.E.P.) May I offer my congratulations. I am certain that this decision will contribute to the success of the coming elections—the only true and equitable way out of this crisis that has done so much harm to the country.
As you may well realize, the Government has not only taken note your concerns regarding professionalization of the National Police, security for the elections, and disarmament, but has made a formal commitment to request technical assistance from the OAS Special Mission. This is evidenced by an exchange of correspondence between the Head of Government and the Representative of the Special Mission on October 29 and 31, 2002.
I am pleased to inform you that the terms of reference of the requested technical assistance are being addressed in intensive working meetings between the two parties. Substantial progress has been made to date, to the clear satisfaction of the Government. The agreed provisions should restore confidence and thus eliminate the remaining obstacles to official announcement of the names of the designées before November 19, 2002, when the present moratorium will expire.
With specific regard to security, the appropriate Government bodies have issued a communiqué unequivocally calling upon elected parliamentary and local officials to abide strictly by the provisions of the 1987 Constitution as regards the bearing of arms and to ensure that their guards respect the spirit and the letter of the Constitution.
As regards reparations following the events of December 17, 2001, the judicial authorities are engaged in intensive negotiations with the law firms appointed by the political parties involved, so as to arrive at common ground in the context of the July 9, 2002, draft interim accord. To date, the case is proceeding on a very positive track. All that remains is to finalize certain details with the Organisation du Peuple en Lutte (O.P.L.).
The Government urges you to bring all your weight to bear in encouraging those other parties who are still hesitating to appoint their representatives to the C.E.P. before the present moratorium expires. An Electoral Council bringing together the nine stipulated members represents a measure of credibility for all and security for the population, and guarantees a win-win solution in the interest of the Nation.
Accept, Messrs. Representatives of the five signatory institutions of the letter of November 4, 2002, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.
Joseph Philippe ANTONIO
Minister of Foreign Affairs
cc: OAS Special Mission in Haiti
The Press
REPUBLIC OF HAITI
Jean-Bertrand Aristide
President
Declaration
To guarantee our inalienable right to life, the President of the Republic, in accordance with Article 135-1 of the Constitution, reminds:
1. Police forces of their statutory obligation to pursue the disarmament campaign without fail throughout the territory;
2. Judicial authorities of their obligation to fight impunity in terms of both common and criminal offenses;
3. Citizens of their right of self-defense, according to Article 268-1 of the Constitution, which provides that “All citizens have the right of armed self-defense within the bounds of their homes, but do not have the right to bear arms without express and justified authorization by the Chief of Police”;
4. Members of parliament and local elected officials of their obligation to limit to an absolute minimum the handguns they carry for personal protection;
5. Private security firms that they are expressly forbidden to show weapons and uniforms outside the specific bounds of their areas of operation.
Jean-Bertrand Aristide
President of the Republic
ANNEX III (a)
DECLARATION OF VERTIERES, 17 NOVEMBER, 2002
http://scm.oas.org/pdfs/2003/annex_III_a.pdf
ANNEX III (b)
DECLARATION OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR, “NON A L’INTOLERABLE, 23 NOVEMBER 2002
DECLARATION DU SECTEUR PRIVE DES AFFAIRES
NON A L’INTOLERABLE !
Le Secteur privé des affaires, à l’unisson, élève aujourd’hui sa voix indignée pour dire au pouvoir Lavalas, que le pays ne peut plus, ne veut plus supporter l’intolérable et l’inacceptable.
Le Secteur privé ne peut plus, ne veut plus accepter que des groupes d’individus se réclamant du parti lavalas et agissant sous la haute protection d’autorités étatiques et de la police, prennent l’initiative de bloquer le pays et la vie nationale par l’instauration d’un climat de terreur, comme ce fut le cas ce 22 novembre 2002.
Alors qu’ils utilisent la violence armée, comme relatée par la presse et l’ensemble des citoyens témoins de leurs forfaits, ces groupes de bandits appuyés publiquement par des officiels du pouvoir, se croient permis d’insulter la conscience nationale en présentant leur action criminelle orchestrée, planifiée et mise en œuvre avec les taxes des contribuables et les équipements de l’Etat, comme une action « pacifique et spontanée » entreprise par la population.
Aussi,
· suite à cette nouvelle journée de violence du 22 novembre 2002 et à la complicité tantôt passive, tantôt active de la police nationale ;
· suite aux exactions récentes commises par des membres d’organisations populaires lavalassiennes contre de simples fonctionnaires de l’Administration et des services publics, contre des membres de la presse, des médias et le secteur des affaires au Cap-Haïtien en raison de leur participation à la marche pacifique du 17 novembre dernier organisée par l’Initiative Citoyenne ;
· suite au comportement brutal de la Police qui a ouvert le feu contre des lycéens qui manifestaient pacifiquement à Petit-Goâve ;
· suite aux affronts à toute forme d’éthique publique et de justice, qui continue à se manifester dans notre pays, notamment dans les cas de « l’Armée cannibale » aux Gonaïves, du groupe « Domi nan bwa » à Petit-Goâve et de « Bale wouze » à St-Marc;
· suite à l’exécution spectaculaire et scandaleuse d’un blessé en pleine salle d’urgence de l’hopital de l’ Université d’Etat d’Haiti ;
· suite aux persécutions et au maintien arbitraire de citoyens en détention ;
· suite aux intimidations de journalistes et de médias, notamment au Cap-Haitien et aux Gonaives ;
· suite aux tracasseries politiques sous forme de répression fiscale exécutée par la DGI, la Douane, le Conatel contre des entreprises et des citoyens qui entendent exercer librement leurs droits fondamentaux garantis par la Constitution ;
· suite à la vaste escroquerie tolérée et non réprimée des coopératives financières ;
· suite aux excès de dépenses publiques du gouvernement engendrant un déficit budgétaire insoutenable ayant des incidences négatives sur le taux de change, le coût de la vie et l’économie nationale.
Le Secteur privé des Affaires dans toutes ses composantes, insulté et bafoué, dit NON, mille fois NON, à cet état de choses qui ne peut et ne doit plus continuer.
Se référant aux Résolutions 806 & 822 de l’OEA et aux situations qui les ont engendrées, les associations du Secteur Privé interprètent la journée du 22 novembre 2002 comme un retour à l’état d’esprit qui avait déclenché les événements inqualifiables du 17 décembre 2001. Toute récidive de tels actes mettra définitivement en danger l’avenir de la nation.
En conséquence, le Secteur privé décide d’intensifier sans délai la concertation avec les secteurs organisés du pays, en vue de prendre les dispositions qui s’imposent.
Dans l’intervalle, les associations patronales exigent du pouvoir exécutif l’arrestation d’ Amiot Metayer et des autres évadés du 2 Août 2002, défi permanent à la justice; l’arrestation de Paul Raymond et de René Civil qui, en plus de graves antécédents, ont revendiqué publiquement les violences et la paralysie de la capitale le 22 novembre dernier.
De plus, les associations patronales demandent la révocation immédiate des fonctionnaires qui ont brillé par leur excès de zèle et ont failli à leur responsabilité.
De l'attitude du pouvoir, dépendra celle des autres partenaires engagés dans le processus initié par la Résolution 822 de l'Organisation des Etats Américains (OEA).
Les organisations du secteur privé suivent attentivement l'évolution de la situation nationale qui déterminera leur position future.
Le secteur privé invite tous les secteurs à respecter les règles du jeu dans l'exercice de leurs droits constitutionnels, sans provocation ni démesure.
En dernier lieu, les associations patronales rappellent à la Police Nationale son devoir de neutralité dans sa mission constitutionnelle de « protéger et servir » la nation.
Port-au-Prince, le 23 novembre 2002
Pour authentification
Association des Industries d’Haïti (ADIH)
_____________________________________________
Chambre de Commerce et d’Industrie d’Haïti (CCIH)
____________________________________
Centre pour la Libre Entreprise et la Démocratie (CLED)
_________________________________
Liste des Institutions du Secteur Privé endossant la Déclaration du 23 novembre 2002
Association des Assureurs d’Haïti (AAH)
Association des Agences de Voyages (ASHAV))
Association des Entrepreneurs de l’Artibonite (AEA)
Association des Industries d’Haïti (ADIH)
Association Maritime Haïtienne(AMARH)
Association Nationale des Distributeurs de Produits Pétroliers (ANADIPP)
Association Nationale des Exportateurs de Mangues (ANEM)
Association Nationale des Medias Haïtiens (ANMH)
Association Touristique d’Haïti (ATH)
Chambre de Commerce et d’Industrie d’Haïti (CCIH)
Chambre de Commerce et d’Industrie de Saint-Marc et du Bas-Artibonite (CCISTBA)
Chambre de Commerce, d’Industrie & des Professions du Nord (CCIPN)
Chambre de Commerce, d’Industrie et des Professions du Sud (CCIPS)
Chambre de Commerce, d’Industrie & des Professions du Sud-Est (CCIPSE)
Chambre Franco-Haïtienne de Commerce et d’Industrie (CFHCI)
Centre pour la Libre Entreprise et la Démocratie (CLED)
Fondation Nouvelle Haïti (FNH)
Haitian-American Chamber of Commerce (HAMCHAM)
ANNEX III (c)
PRESS RELEASE OF THE EPISCOPAL CONFERENCE, 29 NOBEMBER, 2002
CONFÉRENCE ÉPISCOPALE D’HAÏTI
CEH
56, Angle Rues Piquant et Lamarre, B.P. 1572, Port-au-Prince, Haïti / Tél. : 222-5194 / 222-4855 / Fax : 223-5318
E-Mail : ceh56@hotmail.com
COMMUNIQUE
DES ÉVÊQUES D’HAÏTI
AU PEUPLE HAÏTIEN ET A LA COMMUNAUTE INTERNATIONALE
Chers compatriotes, haïtiens et haïtiennes vivant ici et à l’étranger, et vous tous amis d’Haïti,
1. Les nouvelles qui nous parviennent des quatre coins du pays, ces derniers jours, sont très alarmantes. Elles ne cessent de nous interpeller, nous Evêques de l’Eglise Catholique d’Haïti et de nous plonger dans la prière et la réflexion.
2. Nous voyons le peuple, exaspéré par une crise qui a trop duré, sortir de ses gonds. La colère monte. La grogne augmente. On est à deux pas d’un affrontement armé. On voit se profiler à l’horizon le spectre hideux de la guerre civile et fratricide.
3. Pourtant notre histoire, récente et lointaine, nous apprend que les régimes politiques, terminant sur des scènes de violence, de déchoukage et de représailles, n’ont fait que freiner l’avancement du pays et contribuer à son maintien sous tutelle étrangère.
4. Chers compatriotes, nous vivons des temps de dures épreuves, mais loin de nous laisser aller au désespoir, si nous savons nous unir pour y faire face, nous en sortirons aguerris et plus forts, et nous verrons se lever pour nous une nouvelle lumière. Que voulons-nous en effet, pour notre chère Haïti qu’au fond nous aimons tous passionnément ? Ne nous considérons-nous pas toujours issus d’ancêtres communs dont nous sommes si fiers, partageant un même sort et un même sol et empreints de valeurs sociales et culturelles qui nous donnent notre identité ?
Donc nous avons tout pour chercher en tout et partout la voie de l’unité, du dialogue et de la concertation.
5. Néanmoins hélas ! à quoi pouvons-nous comparer la situation actuelle du pays ? Tout nous donne l’impression d’assister au naufrage imminent d’un navire. Ce spectacle impressionnant déclenche diverses attitudes.
6. Tout d’abord c’est l’effroi et l’aigreur de ceux qui sont aux postes de commande. Par suite de fausses manœuvres, ils se sentent trahis, incompris et non secourus. Ils ne maîtrisent plus le bateau et les flots montent furieux. Ils se cramponnent au timon, advienne que pourra, tandis que le vaisseau menace de couler à pic dans l’abîme.
7. Ensuite, c’est la volonté manifeste, de ceux là qui, étant à bord, constatent, non sans satisfaction, la difficulté de l’équipage et appellent de tous leurs vœux l’effondrement de leurs efforts. Il y a aussi à bord des extrémistes opportunistes, toutes tendances confondues, qui choisissent délibérément le chemin de la violence et de la terreur, ou pour maintenir en place l’équipage en difficulté ou pour lui retirer le timon. Ils affichent cette tendance malgré la prévision des pertes incalculables en vies humaines et en biens matériels, et les contre-coups néfastes sur l’ensemble du vaisseau qui est déjà en péril.
8. Enfin, il y a ceux qui sont sur le rivage en toute sécurité et hors de tout danger. Ils sont tous spectateurs. Certains regardent passifs, indifférents. D’autres jettent par-ci par-là des bouées de sauvetage et parviennent même à grimper à bord produisant aide et conseils.
9. Face à ce drame, voici ce que nous vous disons, chers compatriotes, nous Pasteurs de l’Eglise, qui nous trouvons, nous aussi, à bord du bateau.
Le navire en passe de couler, c’est la nation avec ses biens et ses institutions. Unissons-nous tous à l’intérieur du vaisseau, non pour le détruire, mais pour le sauver. Il est souvent dit que les Haïtiens ne peuvent s’unir que pour détruire ou abattre l’ennemi commun et non pour construire et dialoguer avec un opposant. Serrons-nous les coudes pour relever le défi historique. Nous allons nous unir cette fois-ci pour faire œuvre de construction. Nous sommes tous à bord du même bateau. Il s’agit d’arriver à bon port sains et saufs. Entre nous la dialectique du dialogue doit remplacer la dialectique des armes. La recherche du bien commun par tous et pour tous fera qu’il n’y aura ni vainqueur, ni vaincu, ni gagnant, ni perdant. Si vous cherchez un vainqueur, ciblez le peuple tout entier, un gagnant, arrêtez-vous sur l’ensemble de la nation.
Quant à nous, nous n’avons d’autres préoccupations que le bien du peuple. Ce que nous souhaitons, comme vient de le souligner le Saint Père en s’adressant au nouvel Ambassadeur d’Haïti, près le Saint Siège, c’est que soit pris en compte le cri des pauvres.
10. Ceux-là qui sont au timon des affaires et tous les partisans du régime actuel, nous les exhortons à fixer leur regard non pas sur un homme mais sur la nation. Le pouvoir est un service pour le plus grand bien du plus grand nombre. Dans la conjoncture, aujourd’hui comme hier, est-il opportun de s’interroger, savoir : renoncer volontairement au pouvoir pour le plus grand bien de la nation, ou bien écourter magnanimement la durée du pouvoir pour appeler à des élections générales anticipées ? Ou bien serait-il encore possible d’opérer des réformes en profondeur capables de rendre le pouvoir crédible et de rétablir la confiance. Tout est à envisager et rien à exclure pour le bien supérieur de la nation. Vous êtes au rendez-vous de l’histoire. Soyez à la hauteur de votre mission. Nous prions pour qu’il vous soit donné d’en haut le don de la sagesse et du discernement.
11. Quant à ceux qui sont dans l’opposition et qui attendent l’écroulement du régime actuel, nous leur demandons s’ils ont fait tout ce qu’ils auraient pu et même dû faire pour éviter qu’on en soit là. Mettre le capitaine du vaisseau en échec c’est quand même exposer tous ceux qui sont à bord aux conséquences malheureuses d’interminables accidents de parcours. Tout le monde en pâtit encore. Le jour oú ceux qui détiennent le gouvernail le remettent, et nous souhaitons que cela se fasse dans les meilleures conditions, sous forme de passation constitutionnelle et non de déchoukage, ce jour-là, les opposants sauront reconnaître, valoriser et préserver toutes les bonnes initiatives déjà réalisées.
Qu’ils travaillent à consolider les institutions et, dans le cadre et le respect du jeu démocratique, à formuler projet de société, concept de gouvernance ou autres choses semblables.
En parlant d’institution à préserver, nous voulons attirer l’attention de l’opposition sur le CEP. C’est une des institutions indépendantes prévues par la Constitution et dont la nation ne peut se passer. Nous croyons pour notre part que le CEP, même et surtout à l’heure présente, est une nécessité. Nous souhaitons que les conditions pour sa constitution puissent être bientôt réunies. Le CEP serait quand même une balise pour le vaisseau en détresse.
12. Enfin, ceux qui sont sur le rivage, qui veulent participer au sauvetage et arrivent même jusqu’à bord à la rescousse du navire en danger, c’est la communauté internationale. Nous reconnaissons ses efforts dignes et louables, le pays lui en saura gré. Nous lui demandons de se montrer persévérante et patiente, car son accompagnement apportera, à la longue, d’excellents résultats. Cependant nous tenons à lui dire, dans la conjoncture actuelle, de ne pas chercher à substituer ses intentions et ses impératifs aux initiatives citoyennes.
13. Chers compatriotes, haïtiens et haïtiennes d’ici et de l’étranger, nous Pasteurs de l’Eglise, solidaires de vos souffrances et de votre espérance, nous prions le Seigneur, le Dieu de la Vie, par l’intercession de Marie, Mère des douleurs et Etoile de l’Espérance, de nous donner la grâce, en ce temps de l’Avent, de sortir de ce long tunnel, grandis, plus unis entre nous, prêts à construire ensemble une Société nouvelle plus juste, plus prospère et plus fraternelle à laquelle nous aspirons et pour laquelle nous luttons.
Donné au Siège de la Conférence Episcopale d’Haïti, le 29 novembre 2002
___________________________ ________________________
+ Mgr Hubert CONSTANT OMI + Mgr Guire POULARD
Evêque de Fort-Liberté Evêque de Jacmel
Président de la CEH (empêché). Vice-Président de la CEH.
_________________________ ___________________________
+ Mgr Louis KEBREAU SDB + Mgr François W. LIGONDE
Evêque de Hinche Archevêque de Port-au-Prince.
Secrétaire Général de la CEH.
__________________________ _______________________
+ Mgr François GAYOT SMM + Mgr Willy ROMELUS
Archevêque du Cap-Haïtien. Evêque de Jérémie.
___________________________ _____________________________
+ Mgr Frantz COLIMON SMM + Mgr Emmanuel CONSTANT
Evêque de Port-de-Paix. Evêque des Gonaïves .
__________________________ _______________________________
+ Mgr Alix VERRIER + Mgr Joseph Serge MIOT
Evêque des Cayes. Archevêque Coadjuteur
______________________
Administrateur Apostolique
«Sede Plena» de Port-au-Prince.
______________________________ ______________________________
+ Mgr Joseph LAFONTANT + Mgr Pierre Antoine PAULO OMI
Evêque Auxiliaire de Port-au-Prince. Evêque Coadjuteur de Port-de-Paix.
____________________________
+ Mgr Yves Marie PEAN CSC
Evêque Coadjuteur des Gonaïves.
ANNEX III (d)
PROTESTANT DECLARATION, 29 NOVEMBER, 2002
http://scm.oas.org/pdfs/2003/annex_III_d.pdf
ANNEX III (e)
RESOLUTION OF THE SUMMIT OF OPPOSITION POLITICAL FORCES, 15 DECEMBER, 2002
http://scm.oas.org/pdfs/2003/annex_III_e.pdf
ANNEX III (f)
JOINT DECLARATION OF 184 INSTITUTIONS, ASSOCIATIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS, 26 DECEMBER, 2002
PRESS RELEASE No. 1
JOINT DECLARATION
OF 184 INSTITUTIONS, ASSOCIATIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS
OF 12 VITAL SECTORS OF HAITIAN SOCIETY
Having engaged into a process of inter-sector consultations on the country’s situation, the Institutions, Associations and Organizations subscribing the foregoing press release, have decided as follows:
A. to work on an unitary and consensual basis towards the elaboration of the foundations of a new social pact that will contribute to the rebirth of Haïti as a Nation, and towards the improvement of the living conditions of all Haitians, and more particularly of the neediest;
B. to inform the Nation, the Government, the OAS, CARICOM, and friend countries of Haïti and the European Union of their common position as regards the seven (7) essential conditions to be implemented prior to engaging into any credible and democratic electoral process in Haïti, which conditions involve:
1. The concrete and sustained demonstration that all citizens, regardless of their political tendencies, can express their opinions through peaceful public meetings.
2. The dismantling and disarmament of the various well-known armed criminal gangs that are spreading terror throughout the country, namely in Gonaïves, Saint-Marc, Petit-Goâve, Port-au-Prince, and Plateau Central, as well as the dismissal and prosecution of policemen and other public authorities involved therewith.
3. The prosecution of individuals who were clearly identified as heading these armed gangs, who roam the country freely, namely those designated in OAS’s Investigation Committee’s Report on the events of December 17th, 2001, the prosecution of the assassins of Jean L. Dominique, and that of the identified assassins of Brignol Lindor.
4. The release from prison of all citizens arrested illegally because of their political commitment, and of all those having benefited by a decision of Justice.
5. The cessation of heinous and violent declarations made by the principal government officials and their partisans, or by any other sector whatsoever.
6. The adoption by the authorities of concrete dispositions that will allow all journalists, students and other citizens who are harassed and terrorized by armed gang members to resume their work in full security, and without being pursued, namely in Gonaïves, Petit-Goâve, Cap-Haitien and Port-au-Prince.
7. The immediate implementation of international cooperative agreements on security issues, as foreseen by the terms of reference subscribed between the Authorities and the International Community.
The subscribing Institutions and Associations hope, at last, that all these demands will be met, or at least that the beginning of their satisfaction be clearly obtained by January 15, 2003, and they also hope consequently, that, along with the Haitian People, they shall draw the compelling conclusions, depending on the circumstances.
In conclusion:
- Considering the abject misery and hunger, which are consuming the majority of the Haitian People in an intolerable context of insecurity, unemployment and corruption;
- Considering the generalized injustice and impunity that are undermining our national Institutions and their incapacity to bring an appropriate solution to the crisis;
- Considering the patent blocking noted in the implementation of Resolutions 806 and 822 voted by the OAS in its attempt to contribute to the solution of the crisis, which Resolutions were subscribed by the Government of Haïti.
- Considering the various cries of all the sectors of national life, and among others, those of the Episcopal Conference of Haïti and the Protestant Federation of Haïti.
The Institutions and Organizations endorsing the foregoing common statement undertake to remain united and mobilized in the furtherance of their consultations with a larger number of organizations throughout the nine Departments of the country, in order to bring an appropriate and collective answer that is likely to save the Nation from the perils it is facing. We hereby call upon our compatriots to overcome the fear that is gnawing us all, so that we can clearly, but peacefully express ourselves, without violence and with a spirit of tolerance.
Port-au-Prince, Haïti, December 26, 2002.
For authentication (one institution by sector):
_____________________________________ ________________________________
For the Labor Union Movement For the Private Business Sector
Organisation Générale Independante des Travailleurs Chambre de Commerce et d’Industries Haitiens (OGITH) d’Haïti (CCIH)
_____________________________________ __________________________________
For the Farmers’ Sector For the Civic Sector
Mouvman Peyizan Papay (MPP) Initiative de la Société Civile
_____________________________________ _________________________________
For the Socio-Professional Sector For the Teachers’ Sector
Fédération des Barreaux d’Haïti Confederation Nationale des Éducateurs Haitiens (CNEH)
_____________________________________ ___________________________________
For the Media and Press Sector For the Students’ Sector
Groupe de Réflexion et d’Action pour la Liberté de Fédération des Étudiants Universitaires la Presse Haïtiens
_______________________________________ ___________________________________
For the Intellectuals’ Sector For the Sector of Writers and Artists
One Association One Association
________________________________________ __________________________________
For the Urban Grassroot Organizations For the Women’s Association Sector
Vision des Organisations pour le Développement Mouvement des Femmes Haitiennes pour
et la Démocratie pour l’Éducation (Moufhed)
________________________________________
For the Human Rights Sector
Comité des Avocats pour le Respect des Libertés
Individuelles (CARLI)
_____________________________________
Haitian Medical Doctors Association (AMH)
THE LIST OF ALL THE INSTITUTIONS, ASSOCIATIONS AND PERSONALITIES ADHERING TO THIS DECLARATION FOLLOWS HEREAFTER:
http://scm.oas.org/pdfs/2003/annex_III_f.pdf
ANNEX III (g)
SECOND STATEMENT OF THE SUMMIT OF OPPOSITION POLITICAL FORCES, 1 JANUARY, 2003
http:// CPSC01822E01
scm.oas.org/pdfs/2003/annex_III_g.pdf
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[1]. All related documents, including press releases and statements of the Secretary General, the Assistant Secretary General and the Special Mission, are available on the OAS website.
[2]. At the time of the preparation of this report, but subsequent to the reporting period, the Canadian Government had announced a further contribution of CAN$2.0million to the Special Mission.
[3]. Recent statements issued by various Haitian entities regarding the current situation in the country constitute annex 3, (a) to (g)) and are attached in the French original and have not been translated
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